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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to clarify the causes of the poverty trap resulting from a negative
correlation between income and fertility, in a manner that is consistent with the data across
and within countries. This paper points out that a higher fertility rate is the cause of the
poverty trap, because of its educational cost aspect.
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It is known well that a high fertility rate is one of the most remarkable features of the
developing countries (Birdsall 1988). And the fact is commonly recognized to be one of
the serious problems which developing countries face. 1 This common recognition is drawn
from the natural inference that a high fertility rate is not only the result of poverty, but
the causes of the poverty. The recent paper, which has the recognition that a high fertility
rate is the causes of the poverty, is Kremer and Chen (1999) 2 , in which the inﬂuence by
endogenizing fertility rates shows up through the labor market.
In this paper, we deal with an overlapping generations model similar to Glomm and
Ravikumar (1992), in which human capital investment through formal schooling is the
engine of growth. However, to investigate a relationship between a fertility rate and educa-
tional opportunities created by parents (for example, a quality of schools), in our model the
fertility rate is determined endogenously, whereas Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) assume
an exogenous population size. In contrast with Kremer and Chen (1999), in this paper,
the inﬂuence by endogenizing fertility rates appears in change of a quality of schools (not
through the labor market), and this change of the quality of schools aﬀects the eﬀort of
children. This process generates multiple steady states.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the behavior
of individuals. The model is solved in Section 3. Section 4 establishes the evolution of
human capital and contains the welfare analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The Model
In this paper, we consider an overlapping generations model in which individuals live for
two periods. In the ﬁrst period, the individuals decide the amount of time for accumulating
human capital, given the level of their parents’ human capital and the quality of schools.
In the second period, they obtain income and decide consumption volume, fertility rates,
and the quality of schools of their children.
The preferences of an individual born at time t are represented by lt +ct+1 +lnnt+1 +
Alnet+1, where A 2 (0;1), lt is leisure at time t, ct+1 is consumption at time t+1, nt+1
is fertility rate at time t+1, and et+1 is the quality of schools at time t+1. Due to this
quasi-linear utility function, a higher income level leads people to have fewer children, as
shown below. As mentioned in Kremer and Chen (1999, 2000), this function is a convenient
vehicle by which to consider the inﬂuence of the negative correlations between the income
level and fertility and between the quality of schools and fertility. If a log-linear utility
function is assumed, the fertility rate becomes constant. However, this is not consistent
with the actual data, that is, the negative correlation between income and fertility. 3
1Because of the importance of this issue, there are many related studies (Barro and Becker 1989; Becker
and Barro 1986, 1988; Becker et al. 1990; Dahan and Tsiddon 1998; Dessy 2000; Galor and Weil 2000;
Iyigun 2000; and Kremer and Chen 1999).
2In Becker et al. (1990), the multiplicity derives from the assumption on the rates of return on
investments in human capital. Dessy (2000) focuses on an economic value for children’s time. In Iyigun
(2000), a high fertility rate is only the result of poverty.
3There is empirical evidence for the view that substitution eﬀects are important (Schultz 1981). In
addition, Kremer and Chen (1999, 2000) study the relation between the fertility diﬀerentials and inequality,
emphasizing the importance of the substitution eﬀect based on empirical evidence.
1All individuals are endowed with one divisible unit of time in each of the two periods.
At time t, children allocate lt units of their endowment toward leisure and devote the
remaining 1 ¡ lt units toward accumulating human capital:





t; µ > 0; (1)
where ht is the stock of human capital of their parents. We assume that ¯;°;± 2 (0;1),
so that all factors exhibit diminishing returns, and we assume A > ¯ to satisfy the second
order condition for the utility maximization. At time t+1, an individual’s income is the
same as his or her human capital ht+1, assuming a linear technology. Raising each child
requires a time commitment of '. An adult who chooses to have nt+1 children, will spend
a portion 'nt+1 of his or her time caring for children, and the remaining portion 1¡'nt+1
working. An individual allocates his or her income (1 ¡ 'nt+1)ht+1 between consumption
ct+1 and the educational cost of his or her children et+1nt+1. Thus, the budget constraint
becomes ct+1 = ht+1 ¡ (et+1 + 'ht+1)nt+1.
3. Utility Maximization
We solve the utility maximization problem backwards.
3.1 Period 2
Each member of the t-th generation maximizes his or her utility with respect to ct+1,
nt+1, and et+1, given ht+1. The ﬁrst order conditions are as follows:








ct+1 = ht+1 ¡ 1
(2)











In the ﬁrst period, a young individual chooses leisure to maximize the objective func-
tion. Here we deﬁne ht as hL to satisfy @Ut=@ltjlt=1¡A¯ = 0, and also as hH to satisfy
@Ut=@ltjlt=0 = 0.
<case 1 : ht · hL > lt = 1 ¡ A¯.







<case 3 : ht ¸ hH > lt = 0.
4For the sake of simplicity, we suppose the minimum level of consumption is zero.
2In case 1, because the level of parental human capital is too low, individuals do not
have any incentive to accumulate human capital. Thus individuals choose the maximum
leisure time available so long as the second period’s consumption is non-negative. In case
2, individuals determine leisure as an interior solution. In case 3, because the marginal
utility of leisure is always negative, individuals choose the minimum leisure time available,
which is 0. Figure 1 describes the relationship between the parent’s human capital and
the level of eﬀort (or the time of leisure) of their children.
4. Dynamics
Corresponding to the choice of the eﬀort level in the preceding section, the evolution
of human capital is determined:












µ(¯ht+1 ¡ ¯ + A¯)¯(
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1¡A)° : (5)








Since ht takes a constant value h in steady states, from (4), (5), and (6), h satisﬁes the
following conditions:







the interior solution steady state ; ¯
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Four cases of the evolution of human capital exist (ﬁgure 2-5). As ' and µ increase, the
graphs shift up. Figure 3 shows nontrivial multiple steady states. 5 This case consists of
the maximum leisure and the interior solution steady states. The interior solution steady
state E2 shown in ﬁgure 3 describes a situation, where individuals enjoy leisure, too, at
the same time as they are diligent in their studies. But this model connotes a possibility:
Such situation may be accompanied by another situation, where no one has an incentive to
make an eﬀort. The cause of the possibility is a key distinguishing feature and is explained
by characteristics of this model. The intuitional explanation is as follows: Because the
total cost of education is given by the quality of schools et+1 multiplied by the number of
children nt+1, a decrease in the income level ht that is accompanied by an increase in the
fertility rate (see (2)) raises the total cost of education, with the quality of schools ﬁxed.
5See Appendix 1.
3Thus the decrease in ht provides individuals with an environment in which educational
investment is more diﬃcult. This change makes the educational investment decline more.
In addition, from (1) the decrease in the quality of schools makes the level of children’s
eﬀort decline because of its decline of the eﬃciency. Thus the small diﬀerence in the
income level ht causes the large diﬀerence in the next period’s human capital ht+1. This
mechanism creates the multiple steady states and also a development trap.
4.2 Welfare
In ﬁgure 3, E2 is a steady state that realizes a higher income level than E1. However,
E1 is the maximum leisure steady state. Thus, when the economy has multiple steady
states, this model requires welfare analysis.
Proposition 1 Let us deﬁne the lifetime utility of an individual of the t-th generation born
at the steady state E1, as ¯ U1
t , and the lifetime utility of an individual of the t-th generation
born at the steady state E2, as ¯ U2
t . Then, we have the following relationship: ¯ U2
t > ¯ U1
t
Proof. See Appendix 2.
5. Conclusion
This paper clariﬁes the cause of the poverty trap that results from the negative corre-
lation between income and fertility. To capture the population explosion that developing
countries face, we incorporate the inverse relationship between fertility and income into
this model. In low-income countries, high fertility rates make educational costs higher.
Low income and higher educational costs reduce the income level children face in the next
period and thus, reduce the opportunity cost of having children. This eﬀect generates the
multiple steady states.
4Appendix 1. The existence of the multiple steady states
Since the graph of the LHS of (8) has one peak, if ° + ± + ¯ < 1, and (hL;hL
+1) and
(hH;hH
+1) are below the 45-degree line, multiple steady states may exist (hi
+1 means the
level of human capital in the next period, when the current period’s level of human capital
is hi (i = L;H)). One of the multiple steady states satisﬁes (7) and the other satisﬁes (8).
Thus, the existence of above multiple steady states requires two conditions to be met. One
of these is the condition that leads (hL;hL
+1) and (hH;hH
+1) to be below the 45-degree line,
and the other is the condition by which (8) has steady states.
First, we show the condition that leads (hL;hL
+1) and (hH;hH
+1) to be below the 45-
degree line. If (hL;hL













< 1 : (10)
If (hH;hH
+1) is below the 45-degree line, the parameters satisfy the following inequality:
(
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< 1 : (11)
From A¯ < 1, we have A < 1=(1 + ¯ ¡ A¯), so that if ° + ± + ¯ < 1 and Inequality (11)
hold, Inequality (10) always holds.
Next, we show the condition by which (8) has steady states. When ° + ± + ¯ < 1 and
Inequality (11) hold, if the maximum value of the LHS of (8) is greater than the RHS of
(8), steady states exist that satisfy (8). Since the LHS of (8) takes a maximum value at
(1 ¡ A)(° + ± ¡ 1)=(° + ± + ¯ ¡ 1), the maximum value of the LHS of (8) is greater than
the RHS of (8), when the following inequality holds:
¯2¯(1 ¡ ° ¡ ± ¡ ¯)1¡°¡±¡¯





A combination of Inequality (11) with the above inequality generates the following
inequality:
¯2¯(1 ¡ ° ¡ ± ¡ ¯)1¡°¡±¡¯






1 + ¯ ¡ A¯
)
1¡°¡± :
Thus, when the parameters satisfy this inequality, there are two stable steady states
(Figure 3). Q.E.D.











t+1)) express the maximum life-
time utility at points E1 and E2, respectively.
Assume that an individual born at equilibrium E2 chooses leisure time ˆ lt that makes
next period’s income ˆ h2
t+1 and h1






















t always holds. Therefore, it is
clear that l1
t < ˆ lt always stands. When the second period’s income is the same level, the
utility from the second period’s choices is also the same level. Thus, the lifetime utility
diﬀerential results from the diﬀerential of leisure time. Since l1
































Because the choices (ˆ lt,c1
t+1,e1
t+1,n1
t+1) at the steady state E2 are diﬀerent from the
optimal choices that appear in the third formulation, the relation between the second and
third formulation always holds. Q.E.D.
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Figure 3: The evolution of human capital: The maximum leisure steady state E1 and the









Figure 4: The evolution of human capital: The maximum leisure steady state E1 and the







Figure 5: The evolution of human capital: The minimum leisure steady state E3
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